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Abstract
The widespread use of digital video surveillance sys-
tems has also increased the concerns for violation of
privacy rights. Since video surveillance systems are in-
vasive, it is a challenge to find an acceptable balance
between privacy of the public under surveillance and
the functionalities of the systems. Tools for protection
of visual privacy available today lack either all or some
of the important properties such as security of protected
visual data, reversibility (ability to undo privacy protec-
tion), simplicity, and independence from the video en-
coding used. To overcome these shortcomings, in this
paper, we propose a morphing-based privacy protection
method and focus on its robustness, reversibility, and
security properties. We morph faces from a standard
FERET dataset and run face detection and recognition
algorithms on the resulted images to demonstrate that
morphed faces retain the likeness of a face, while mak-
ing them unrecognizable, which ensures the protection
of privacy. Our experiments also demonstrate the in-
fluence of morphing strength on robustness and secu-
rity. We also show how to determine the right param-
eters of the method.
1. Introduction
Protection of visual privacy in video surveillance is
an important and challenging task. Although many dif-
ferent privacy protection methods are available, none
has all the following desired properties: (i) reversibility
(possibility to undo protection on request from authori-
ties), (ii) flexibility of application (independent of com-
pression and video or image data format), (iii) robust-
ness (high level of distortion to render images unrec-
ognizable), (iv) security (recovery of the original data
using a secret key) and resistance to malicious attacks,
and (v) variable strength granularity (flexibility to pro-
tect data with different degrees of strength). Simple
methods like blurring, pixelization, and masking are
not reversible and insecure; encryption-based methods,
such as proposed in [3, 14, 5] are secure but remove
original pixel data, are opaque and fragile (change in
one pixel destroys encryption); scrambling [11, 7] has
advantages of encryption, while being robust to com-
pression, but it is dependent on video or image com-
pression; and anonymization methods like in [13] are
often complex and require original data to be stored
separately.
To overcome these shortcomings, we propose to use
morphing-based method for protection of visual pri-
vacy, which, we believe, combines all the desired prop-
erties of a visual privacy protection method with no
notable shortcomings. When conventional morphing
is applied, pixels are interpolated into corresponding
locations of the target image and their intensities are
replaced with the corresponding pixels in the target im-
age. In the proposed method, we perform only partial
randomized morphing in both dimensions: interpola-
tion and intensity. That means the resulted morphed
image will be interpolated somewhere in-between orig-
inal source and target images and intensities of the re-
sulted pixels will be weighted accordingly, thus destroy-
ing original specific visual details in the image. Hence,
the balance between privacy protection and surveil-
lance task is transformed into the strength value by
how much the pixels in an image are morphed. In the
proposed morphing algorithm, a set of key points are
determined in both original source and target images
and a correspondence between these key points is es-
tablished. Morphing is performed by dividing both im-
ages in triangles using Delaunay triangulation [2].
Since morphing is applied to pixel data, it is inde-
pendent of compression methods. A security can be in-
sured by using a secret key for seeding a pseudo-random
algorithm, which is used for randomizing interpolation
and intensity weights, as well as, for encryption of the
key points used for triangulation. Recovering original
image from the morphed one can be done by applying
the inverse morphing transformation, given that the
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed method.
target image, key points, and interpolation and inten-
sity values are known.
We demonstrate feasibility of the proposed mor-
phing method by applying it to faces of a standard
FERET face dataset [10], since faces are among the
most privacy sensitive regions. Location of each face
is first detected with Viola-Jones [12] face detection
algorithm. A set of key points, used as triangle ver-
tices in the morphing transformation, is constructed
from automatically detected eyes, nose, and mouth.
To determine reversibility, robustness, and security of
the method, we use Eigenfaces, Fisherfaces [1], and lo-
cal binary patterns histograms (LBPH) [6] based face
recognition algorithms. The recognition algorithms
were run on the morphed and recovered faces to de-
termine the efficiency of the proposed visual privacy
protection tool. In an ideal scenario, a protected face
would be visible as a face but would not be correctly
identified by the recognition algorithm.
2. Morphing based privacy protection
In this section, we describe visual privacy protec-
tion method based on morphing. To demonstrate how
such privacy protection works, we assume face to be
a sensitive region to which the protection is applied.
The following is the summary, illustrated in Figure 1,
of morphing based privacy protection method:
• Automatically select key points in both original
source and target (e.g., a standard human face)
images by using face, eyes, nose, and mouth de-
tections;
• For each pair of the corresponding points in two
images determine some point in between, by using
a given level of interpolation value;
• Divide images using Delaunay triangulation [2]
with determined points as vertices of the triangles;
• Find coordinates of pixels in the final image by
interpolating both source and target images ac-
cording to each corresponding triangle;
• For each pixel in the final image, compute its in-
tensity as a weighted sum of intensities between
corresponding pixels in original source image and
target image. Weights are determined by a given
intensity strength value such as in
If = (1− wi)Is + wiIt, (1)
where If , Is, It are final morphed, original source,
and target faces respectively, and wi is the inten-
sity strength value.
As can be noticed form the algorithm’s summary
and Figure 1, two main values determine the final mor-
phed face: interpolation level and intensity strength.
Figure 2 demonstrate the effect of different such values
on the morphed image. When interpolation level and
intensity strength are zero, the resulted face is the same
as the original, but the closer these values are to one,
the more the resulted face looks like the target face. In
our demonstrations and experiment, an average male
face [4] was chosen as the target face, but, in practical
applications, it can be any other face or facial avatar.
In a surveillance scenario, when a protected face
needs to be recovered, an inverse of morphing opera-
tion, termed unmorphing, is applied. For the recovery
of the original source face, the key points and the tar-
get face need to be known. The recovery algorithm is
essentially the same as morphing, instead we simply
estimate a starting face (source) by using known the
‘middle’ (morphed) and the end (target) faces (see 1).
This morphing-based visual privacy protection
method is designed to overcome common shortcomings
of other privacy protection techniques. Since morph-
ing is simply a geometrical transformation of pixels,
with pixels interpolated into weighted sum of known
intensities, it is compression independent, as opposed
to scrambling, while retaining the main features of the
morphed region (such as face), as opposed to encryp-
tion privacy protection methods. Security of the pro-
posed method can be ensured by encrypting the key
points (the vertices of Dalaunay triangles) of the mor-
phing algorithm and randomizing interpolation level
and intensity strength values for each morphed trian-
gle (see Figure 2f for illustration), as we discuss in more
details in Section 2.2.
We use standard FERET dataset [10] (a subset of
100 faces) with provided ground truth for testing the
proposed morphing-based privacy protection. Morph-
ing was applied to faces in the dataset, which were de-
tected with Viola-Jones face detection [12] algorithm.
For vertices of Delaunay triangles, 18 key points were
automatically selected based on the detected eyes (5
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Figure 2: Examples of morphing the same face with different interpolation levels and intensity strengths.
points for each eye), nose (3 points), and mouth (5
points) in a face. To evaluate the robustness and secu-
rity of the proposed algorithm, we run OpenCV1 im-
plementations of Viola-Jones face detection and three
face recognition algorithms, which are based on Eigen-
faces, Fisherfaces [1], and LBPH [6], on the morphed
faces and recovered faces. We use gallery (‘fa’ set of
faces) and probe (‘fb’ set of faces) images provided by
FERET dataset for the recognition task.
2.1. Robustness and reversibility
The aim of the experiments is to determine whether
the morphing preserves the generic features of a face, in
which case the accuracy of a face detection algorithm
would not be affected by morphing, i.e., faces would
be detected as for original images, while the specific
personal features are distorted, which would lead to
the significant decrease in recognition accuracy.
To understand the effect of interpolation level and
intensity strength values on the recognition accuracy,
we vary these values from 0 to 1 with step 0.1,
and for each pair of values, we run recognition algo-
1http://opencv.willowgarage.com/wiki/
rithms on the resulted morphed faces from FERET
dataset. Figure 3 demonstrates the resulted tradeoff
for Fisherfaces-based approach (for other recognition
algorithms the results are similar but omitted here due
to space limitations). In the figure, vertical axis reflects
the accuracy of recognition computed as rank one of
cumulative match characteristic (CMC) [8], which is a
standard measure of accuracy for identification task of
recognition. Horizontal axis of the figure shows changes
in intensity strength, while each plotted curve corre-
sponds to different interpolation levels. Recognition
accuracy corresponding to interpolation level and in-
tensity strength values 0 is essentially the same as for
original non-morphed images.
Figure 3 demonstrates a significant drop (until al-
most 0) in accuracy for higher values of intensity
strength and interpolation level. It can be also noted
that intensity strength affects recognition accuracy
more significantly. This figure can help in determin-
ing values of these parameters in practical implemen-
tations.
To demonstrate reversibility of the morphing-based
approach, we conducted similar experiment for recov-
ered faces and plot corresponding recognition results
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Figure 3: Accuracy of Fisherface recognition for mor-
phed faces with different interpolation level and inten-
sity strength values.
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Figure 4: Accuracy of Fisherface recognition on faces
recovered from morphed with different interpolation
level and intensity strength values.
in Figure 4. In this figure, recovered faces were ob-
tained by unmorphing the faces morphed for previous
experiments. The figure demonstrates that recognition
accuracy does not change compared to the accuracy
for original images until the intensity strength value
becomes 1.0. With intensity strength 1.0, the end-
resulted morphed face does not contain even a fraction
of intensities from the original source face (see Equa-
tion 1), and, therefore, the intensity values of the orig-
inal face cannot be recovered from the morphed one at
all. Hence, in practical applications, intensity strength
of morphing-based privacy protection should always be
strictly less than 1.0.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that morphing-based
distortion of faces significantly decreases accuracy of
recognition, while being reversible in most cases (ex-
cept for intensity strength 1.0). These results are very
promising, especially since it was previously shown that
recognition algorithms perform well even in cases of sig-
nificant distortions [9].
To understand the effect of morphing method on
face detection, we also run Viola-Jones face detection
algorithm on the images from FERET dataset with
faces replaced by the morphed versions obtained by
changing all combinations of interpolation level and
intensity strength. Detection accuracy was the same
for all morphed and recovered images, with excep-
tion when intensity strength is 1.0 for recovered im-
ages, as for the original images, which is 100% accu-
racy (FERET dataset is ‘easy’ for detection algorithm).
There was only slighter increase in false positive (to
0.8%) for morphed faces. We did not plot these results
to avoid cluttering the space with trivial plots.
2.2. Security
There are two ways to make the recovering of orig-
inal faces from morphed with the proposed approach
difficult: encrypt key points (vertices of Delaunay tri-
angles) and randomize the choice of interpolation level
and intensity strength values for each triangle. Since
the number of key points is relatively small (we use
18 points in our experiments), their encrypted values
brings little overhead to storage and can be embed-
ded as an additional information inside an image, e.g.,
in JPEG image format, APPn markers can be used.
Interpolation level and intensity strength can be ran-
dom values generated in a certain interval by pseudo-
random algorithm with a secret key as its seed. Fig-
ure 2f shows an example of such randomized morph-
ing. To recover original faces, key points, target im-
age, morphed image, and a series of interpolation level
and intensity strength values are necessary to perform
the same unmorphing operation as for non-randomized
method.
Experiments in the previous section show that in-
terpolation level and intensity strength values need to
be properly selected for morphing to render faces un-
recognizable. By looking on Figure 3, we can estimate
intervals 0.5− 1.0 for interpolation level and 0.5− 0.9
for intensity strength as appropriate. These intervals
should ensure that morphing-based protection will be
robust, i.e., lead to low recognition for morphed and
high recognition for recovered faces.
To validate our reasoning, we run recognition al-
gorithms on randomized faces when different intervals
for interpolation level and intensity strength values are
used. The results for morphed and corresponding re-
Table 1: Recognition accuracy for randomized morphed/recovered faces, FERET dataset.
Parameters
Eigen
(morphed)
Eigen
(recovered)
Fisher
(morphed)
Fisher
(recovered)
LPBH
(morphed)
LPBH
(recovered)
Interp: 0.0-1.0,
Intens: 0.0-0.9
0.38 0.91 0.39 0.91 0.36 0.90
Interp: 0.5-1.0,
Intens: 0.5-0.9
0.07 0.90 0.07 0.90 0.08 0.90
Interp: 0.5-1.0,
Intens: 0.6-0.9
0.08 0.90 0.07 0.90 0.04 0.88
Interp: 0.5-1.0,
Intens: 0.7-0.9
0.03 0.90 0.03 0.91 0.04 0.88
Interp: 0.6-1.0,
Intens: 0.5-0.9
0.06 0.91 0.06 0.91 0.08 0.91
Interp: 0.6-1.0,
Intens: 0.6-0.9
0.06 0.91 0.06 0.91 0.05 0.88
Interp: 0.6-1.0,
Intens: 0.7-0.9
0.02 0.91 0.03 0.91 0.02 0.91
Interp: 0.7-1.0,
Intens: 0.5-0.9
0.08 0.91 0.08 0.91 0.05 0.91
Interp: 0.7-1.0,
Intens: 0.6-0.9
0.06 0.90 0.05 0.90 0.06 0.87
Interp: 0.7-1.0,
Intens: 0.7-0.9
0.04 0.91 0.04 0.91 0.03 0.89
Table 2: Recognition accuracy for faces unmorphed (with assumed interpolation 0.5 and intensity 0.5) from ran-
domized morphed faces, FERET dataset. Illustration of a possible attack on the faces morphed with our method.
Parameters Eigen Fisher LPBH
Interp: 0.5-1.0, Intens: 0.5-0.9 0.31 0.31 0.17
Interp: 0.5-1.0, Intens: 0.6-0.9 0.16 0.15 0.11
Interp: 0.5-1.0, Intens: 0.7-0.9 0.10 0.10 0.10
Interp: 0.6-1.0, Intens: 0.5-0.9 0.23 0.22 0.20
Interp: 0.6-1.0, Intens: 0.6-0.9 0.17 0.16 0.14
Interp: 0.6-1.0, Intens: 0.7-0.9 0.07 0.07 0.09
Interp: 0.7-1.0, Intens: 0.5-0.9 0.29 0.29 0.13
Interp: 0.7-1.0, Intens: 0.6-0.9 0.13 0.13 0.12
Interp: 0.7-1.0, Intens: 0.7-0.9 0.06 0.06 0.09
covered faces are shown in Table 1 for three recogni-
tion algorithms. First line of the table shows recog-
nition when the most liberal intervals are used with
interpolation level in 0.0−1.0 and intensity strength in
0.0 − 0.9. Recognition for morphed images is not low
enough in this case. However, when we restrict inter-
vals to 0.5− 1.0 ranges, recognition accuracy for mor-
phed faces drops to acceptable low levels, while recog-
nition of recovered faces remain high. The best pair of
intervals, however, would be the one that leads to the
highest gap between recognition accuracies for recov-
ered faces and for morphed faces. This pair of intervals
is highlighted in the table with bold.
As well known in cryptography, the security of the
algorithm should depend only on secrecy of the private
key. That means, when evaluating the security of our
approach, we should assume that a potential malicious
attacker knows both the morphing algorithm and the
target face. In such case, with what accuracy can at-
tacker recover the original faces from the randomized
morphed versions? Key points can be estimated from
morphed face by using the same automated algorithm
that we use in our morphing method (based on auto-
matically detected eyes, nose, and mouth locations).
Instead of using random values for interpolation level
and intensity strength, one can assume a fixed reason-
able value, for example 0.5, which is a mid point be-
tween 0 and 1. Using these assumptions, we run un-
morphing algorithm on morphed images obtained us-
ing different randomization intervals. The recognition
accuracies for these unmorphed faces are presented in
Table 2. These results show that intensity strength is
significantly more important parameter than interpola-
tion level, as was first noted in our robustness findings
in Section 2.1, and it should be chosen with care in
practice. The table also demonstrates that the method
is the best in withstanding the attack when using the
pair of intervals 0.6 − 1.0 for interpolation level and
0.7 − 0.9 for intensity strength, as also chosen in Ta-
ble 1.
3. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a new morphing-based
visual privacy protection algorithm for video surveil-
lance. By using recognition and detection algorithms,
we demonstrated that the proposed method keeps
the general facial features intact, thus allowing undis-
tracted conduct of surveillance task, while distorting
the specific facial information rendering faces equally
unrecognizable by three different recognition algo-
rithm, this ensuring protection of privacy. The exper-
imental results shown that the method has high re-
versibility, robustness, and security.
We also demonstrated that interpolation level has
little influence on the robustness of the morphing based
privacy protection. This finding may imply that purely
geometrical-based methods that do not significantly
change intensities of pixels in the image may not be
very suitable for privacy protection. On the other
hand, the choice of intensity strength value is crucial,
and should be carefully chosen in practical implemen-
tations, for the proposed method to be robust and re-
sistant to security attacks.
These results motivate us to perform subjective eval-
uations of the proposed morphing-based privacy pro-
tection using human subjects to see whether the sub-
jective recognition aligns with obtained objective re-
sults. We would also like to test how resilient this
method is to non-malicious attacks, such as compres-
sion.
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